Inhaltsverzeichnis Siglenverzeichnis Christoph Binkelmann: Einleitung Hartmut Traub: J. G. Fichte: Eine Philosophen-Identität zwischen Politik und Wissenschaft Nationale Identität Peter L. Oesterreich: ¿Deutscher Ernst¿. Zu Fichtes rhetorischer Erfindung nationaler Identität Tilman Reitz: Die Nation als geistiger Wirkungsraum der Philosophie. Fichtes kulturpolitische Wende Cristiana Senigaglia: Der Begriff der Nation am Scheideweg: Fichtes ¿Reden¿ und ihre Bedeutung Marco Rampazzo Bazzan: Unter der Konjunktur denken: Fichtes Auseinandersetzung mit Machiavelli Jean-Christophe Goddard: Fichte oder der ständige Aufstand der Ureinwohner Soziale Identität Roberta Picardi: Geschichte und (...) europäische Identität bei Fichte Diogo Ferrer: Fichtes transzendentale Modelle der Geschichte Quentin Landenne: Die Bildungsgesellschaft als Integrationsdynamik der sozialen Perspektiven bei Fichte Cristiana Senigaglia: Freiheitsvollzug und Anerkennungsanspruch. Fichte, Charles Taylor und die heutige Fragestellung Individuelle Identität Christoph Asmuth: Die Unfreiheit einer Stahlfeder. Fichtes Sittenlehre von 1798 Christoph Binkelmann: Das Mehr in mir. Die Willkür in der Identitätsbildung nach Fichte Franziskus v. Heereman: »Als diese Ich sind wir alle Nichts«? Zur Person beim letzten Fichte Rocco Porcheddu: Praktisches Selbstbewusstsein und Autonomie bei Fichte, Frankfurt und Kant Rezensionen Tagungsbericht. (shrink)

In a life-span perspective, Baglio and Marchetti make the hypothesis of “the existence of multiple kinds of Theory of Mind” and urge the transition from a discrete to a dimensional approach in the study of mentalization (“ToM may vary along a quantitative and a qualitative continuum”). We resist such a plea and argue that we can stick to a discrete approach which posits just a single early-developing mindreading system, and then works out a “third-person first” perspective on mentalization, according to (...) which the understanding of other minds both ontogenetically precedes and grounds the understanding of our own minds. In this third-person first framework, Baglio and Marchetti’s claim that mentalization is “a multifaceted set of competences liable to influence -- and be influenced by -- a manifold of psychosocial aspects” is reformulated as follows: first-person mentalization evolves in an interplay of third-person mentalization, autobiographical memory and socio-communicative skills attuned by cultural variables. Let us examine these points one by one.In the first place, we take a nativist-modularist perspective on third-person mentalization (henceforth “mindreading”). After Onishi and Baillargeon’s (2005) groundbreaking paper, enough evidence has accumulated to endorse the hypothesis that a form of primary mindreading is not a developmental achievement, but an innate social-cognitive evolutionary adaptation (Baillargeon et al., 2013, 2014). Such adaptation is implemented... (shrink)

Preterm discharge effects: Relationship between the maternal experience and newborn's psychobiological regulation The purpose of this study is to investigate how the past experiences of mothers and their potentially traumatic events during pregnancy may have influenced the processes of psychobiological self-regulation and cognitive development in a child born preterm. Eighty children who had a gestational age of < 32 weeks were examined at the 9th month of the corrected age. The mothers and children were divided in two groups: multipara mothers (...) and their children and the primipara mothers and their children. These children were examined on the basis of sleep disorders, nutritional problems and mental development. Perinatal data from clinical observations and data from standardized developmental tests were used to describe the differences. The children of primipara mothers who had unexpected preterm delivery presented major incidences of sleep disorders while the children of primipara mothers, who programmed preterm delivery, presented a major incidences of nutrition problems. The predictability of preterm delivery has a major influence on the capacity of newborns for self-regulation in the case of primipara mothers. (shrink)

: In this article we shall deal with the construction and defense of subjective identity as a topic at the intersection of psychology and anthropology. In this perspective, defense mechanisms are seen as falling along a spectrum that stretches from the individual to the collective level. The individual mind is the sphere of the intrapsychic defenses and the interpersonal maneuvers to which each of us appeals, in the relationship with other people and with one’s own environment, to defend one’s own (...) self-describability and, indissolubly, the solidity of one’s own self-conscious being. At a social and collective level, on the other hand, the individual self-protective structures are supported by cultural interventions that organize and intersubjectively “domesticate” our subjectivity and our feeling of being-there. Keywords: Autobiographical Reasoning; Defense Mechanisms; Grief; Narrative Identity; Ontological Insecurity Meccanismi di difesa: dall’individuale al collettivo Riassunto: L’articolo si occupa di costruzione e difesa dell’identità soggettiva come tema all’intersezione di psicologia e antropologia. In questa prospettiva, i meccanismi di difesa si dispongono lungo uno spettro che dal livello individuale conduce a quello collettivo. La mente individuale è la sfera delle difese intrapsichiche e delle manovre interpersonali a cui ognuno di noi fa ricorso, nella relazione con gli altri e col proprio ambiente, per difendere la propria autodescrivibilità e, inscindibilmente, la solidità del proprio essere autocosciente. Al livello sociale e collettivo, invece, le strutture autoprotettive dell’individuo sono sorrette da interventi culturali che organizzano e “addomesticano” intersoggettivamente la nostra soggettività e il nostro sentirci esistere. Parole chiave: Ragionamento autobiografico; Meccanismi di difesa; Cordoglio; Identità narrativa; Insicurezza ontologica. (shrink)

Il saggio analizza la polemica tra Sarah e Angelina Grimké, Catharine Beecher e Harriet Martineau sull'abolizione della schiavitù e i diritti delle donne, esaminando l'utilizzo di due strumenti critici: i «vincoli di femminilità» e l’«analogia» tra condizione della donna e dello schiavo. Da questo ricco e teso confronto, emerge in particolare che il riconoscere o meno il nesso tra dominio razziale e sessuale è determinante nella definizione di differenti concezioni della femminilità. Inoltre, queste differenze si ripercuotono sul modo di intendere (...) i concetti chiave della democrazia e sulla possibilità di ripensarli criticamente. (shrink)

Purpose of this text is to present some critiques on the theories of Ernesto Laclau on populism, in particular way on those present in La ragione populista. The text is divided essentially in three parts, in the first one I will brefly illustrate the recent story of Argentina as it is fundamental to understand the development of the thought of the Latin American philosopher. In the second part of the essay I will present the main theoretical proposals within La ragione (...) populista. The last part of the text will be dedicated to a close examination of two central elements of Laclau's theory; the minimum unit of analysis chosen, and the relation between populism and institutions. Almost the whole texts that I will use, in order to underline some critical issues in the Laclausian's thought, come from the Latin American's framework, which in the last decade could experience merits and limits both on Laclau's thought and on populisms which really exist, or existed, today in Latin America. (shrink)

Background: Moral distress, defined as moral suffering or a psychological imbalance, can affect nursing students. However, many new instruments or adaptations of other scales that are typically used to measure moral distress have not been used for nursing students. Aim: This study aimed to translate, culturally adapt and evaluate the psychometric properties of an Italian version of the Moral Distress Scale for Nursing Students (It-ESMEE) for use with delayed nursing students (students who could not graduate on time or failed the (...) exams necessary to progress to the next level). Research design: The study used a cross-sectional research design. Participants and research context: Incidental sampling resulted in a sample of 282 delayed nursing students (mean age = 26.73 ± 4.43 years, 73% female) enrolled between May and August 2020 in a University of central Italy. Ethical considerations: The research protocol was approved by the internal review board of the university, and all participants provided their written informed consent. Results: The study confirmed a multidimensional second-order factorial structure for the It-ESMEE with five dimensions: improper institutional conditions to teach user care, authoritarian teaching practices, disrespect for the ethical dimension of vocational training, lack of competence of the teacher and commitment of ethical dimension of user care. The internal consistency was high (0.753–0.990 across the factors), and the standard error of measurement and smallest detectable change were adequate. Discussion: The It-ESMEE is able to assess moral distress in delayed nursing students with good validity and reliability. It can be used in research and to determine moral distress levels, helping teachers to monitor the condition in nursing students. Conclusion: This instrument can help in comprehending moral distress, enabling students to develop coping and intervention strategies to maintain their well-being, and to ensure the quality of nurse education. (shrink)

Consciousness is arguably the most important interdisciplinary area in contemporary philosophy of mind, with an explosion of research over the past thirty years from philosophers, psychologists, and scientists. It is also perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the world despite the fact that it is familiar to each of us. Consciousness also seems resistant to any straightforward physical explanation. This book introduces readers to the contemporary problem of consciousness, providing a clear introduction to the overall landscape and a fair-minded critical (...) survey of various theories of consciousness. Beginning with essential historical background to the problem of consciousness, Rocco Gennaro explores the following key topics and debates: the metaphysical problem of consciousness, including varieties of dualism and materialism; consciousness and neuroscience, particularly the question of whether consciousness can be reduced to brain activity or attentional mechanisms; representational and cognitive theories of consciousness; consciousness and psychopathology; animals, machines, and consciousness. Extensive use is made of interesting phenomena throughout the book, ranging from blindsight, synaesthesia, and change blindness to phantom limb syndrome, split-brain cases, and dissociative identity disorder. The inclusion of chapter summaries, annotated further reading, and a glossary make this book essential reading for anyone seeking a clear and informative overview of the problem of consciousness, not only in philosophy but related fields such as psychology and cognitive science. (shrink)

Consciousness is arguably the most important area within contemporary philosophy of mind and perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the world. Despite an explosion of research from philosophers, psychologists, and scientists, attempts to explain consciousness in neurophysiological, or even cognitive, terms are often met with great resistance. In The Consciousness Paradox, Rocco Gennaro aims to solve an underlying paradox, namely, how it is possible to hold a number of seemingly inconsistent views, including higher-order thought (HOT) theory, conceptualism, infant and (...) animal consciousness, concept acquisition, and what he calls the HOT-brain thesis. He defends and further develops a metapsychological reductive representational theory of consciousness and applies it to several importantly related problems. Gennaro proposes a version of the HOT theory of consciousness that he calls the "wide intrinsicality view" and shows why it is superior to various alternatives, such as self-representationalism and first-order representationalism. HOT theory says that what makes a mental state conscious is that a suitable higher-order thought is directed at that mental state. -/- Thus Gennaro argues for an overall philosophical theory of consciousness while applying it to other significant issues not usually addressed in the philosophical literature on consciousness. Most cognitive science and empirical works on such topics as concepts and animal consciousness do not address central philosophical theories of consciousness. Gennaro’s integration of empirical and philosophical concerns will make his argument of interest to both philosophers and nonphilosophers. (shrink)

Influenser från grekisk filosofi på 1900-talets filosofi.

A review of Inna Semetsky’s The Edusemiotics of Images: Essays on the Art-Science of Tarot with reference to Peircean semiotics, Deleuze’s philosophy of difference and the feminist ethics of care.

In this essay I will discuss the issue of vagueness when defining the concept of open work within the philosophy of Umberto Eco (1932-2016), particularly considering its relevance for the development of his original semiotic view. The analysis of vagueness allows us to stress the importance of Eco’s concept of open work not only in Opera Aperta (1962) but in different phases of his thought. This paper is divided into five sections. Section 1 briefly outlines the Peircean notion of vagueness, (...) trying to understand it as a pivotal concept to define the structure and dynamical form of the open work. Section 2 dwells on the concept of quality in both John Dewey and Charles Sanders Peirce: here the possibility of articulating an interpretation is considered embodied in the vague immediacy of the qualitative experience. Section 3 analyses to what extent an artwork can be considered open and in motion, according to the Pareysonian concepts of form and interpretation. Section 4 stresses the hypothesis that vagueness produces not only the condition of possibility of an open work and of its multiple interpretations, but also an increase of information due to its aesthetic quality. Section 5 calls into question the distinction between use and interpretation and specifies that interpreting an open work does not mean using it for your own purposes but interpreting a developmental movement towards its own fulfilment; a text is nothing other than the rule that constitutes the universe of its interpretations. (shrink)

Jean-Paul Sartre believed that consciousness entails self-consciousness, or, even more strongly, that consciousness is self-consciousness. As Kathleen Wider puts it in her terrific book The Bodily Nature of Consciousness: Sartre and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind, ‘all consciousness is, by its very nature, self-consciousness.’ I share this view with Sartre and have elsewhere argued for it at length. My overall aim in this paper is to examine Sartre's theory of consciousness against the background of the so-called ‘higher-order thought theory of consciousness’ (...) which, in turn, will shed light on the structure of conscious mental states as well as on Sartre's theory of consciousness and reflection. Another goal of this paper is, following Wider, to show how Sartre's views can be understood from a contemporary analytic perspective. Sartre's theory of consciousness is often confusing to the so-called ‘analytic Anglo-American’ tradition, but I attempt to show how this obstacle can be overcome against the backdrop of a specific contemporary theory of consciousness. (shrink)

“Leibniz on Consciousness and Self‐Consciousness” It is argued that Leibniz held a version of the so‐called “higher‐order thought” theory of consciousness. According to this theory, what makes a mental state conscious is that it is accompanied by a thought that one is in that state. For example, in elaborating on his theory of monads, Leibniz explains that an unconscious perception becomes conscious when it is accompanied by an apperception of it. Apperception is best understood as a form of self‐consciousness, and (...) reflection is best understood as a sophisticated form of apperception. With these crucial terminological distinctions in place, it is then argued that treating Leibniz as a HOT theorist can help us understand how he did indeed hold that animals apperceive even if most of them are incapable of sophisticated forms of reflection and rationality. (shrink)

Various psychopathologies of self-awareness, such as somatoparaphrenia and thought insertion in schizophrenia, might seem to threaten the viability of the higher-order thought (HOT) theory of consciousness since it requires a HOT about one’s own mental state to accompany every conscious state. The HOT theory of consciousness says that what makes a mental state a conscious mental state is that there is a HOT to the effect that “I am in mental state M.” I have argued in previous work that a (...) HOT theorist can adequately respond to this concern with respect to somatoparaphrenia and thought insertion. There is also Cotard syndrome which is a rare neuropsychiatric disorder in which people hold the delusional belief that they are dead, do not exist, or have lost their blood or internal organs. In this paper, I argue that HOT theory has nothing to fear from it either and can consistently account for what happens in such unusual cases. I analyze Cotard syndrome in light of my previous discussion of somatoparaphrenia and thought insertion, and argue that HOT theory can provide a somewhat analogous account without the worry of inconsistency. It is crucial to recognize that there are multiple “self-concepts” and levels of HOTs which can help to provide a more nuanced explanation. With regard to the connection between consciousness and self-consciousness, it is proposed that Cotard patients are indeed capable of having some “I-thoughts” about their bodies and mental states. (shrink)

In questo articolo ci proponiamo di portare alla luce i netti confini che separano i concetti di mindreading, introspezione e metacognizione con l’obiettivo di dissipare alcuni fraintendimenti presenti nella letteratura clinica. A tal fine, iniziamo identificando due posizioni principali nell’odierno dibattito filosofico cognitivo sull’introspezione: da un lato le teorie che sostengono che “introspezione” è la denominazione impropria per un processo interpretativo; da un altro lato le teorie che continuano a ritenere che almeno in alcuni casi l’accesso alla propria mente sia (...) diretto e non interpretativo. Dopodiché prendiamo posizione contro le teorie dell’accesso diretto e in favore di una certa versione dell’approccio interpretativista. Infine, da questo approccio ricaviamo alcune linee guida per l’uso della Theory of Mind in neuropsichiatria cognitiva. (shrink)

According to Gustave Guillaume, a linguist endowed with incontestable speculative depth, though misunderstood by the linguists and philosophers of his time and rather ignored in linguistic textbooks, language has a temporal architecture, determined by the articulation of time, which from the present, is projected into the future, while having and maintaining its roots in the past. The present is only the interval between the past and the future. As such, time, however, cannot be represented by way of itself: it requires (...) a representation that can only be made via spatial instruments. Guillaume has the merit of having considered human language in the temporal dimension of thought operations, causing it to become an interpretive paradigm of language itself. This is a paradigm able to give a sufficiently well-founded explanation for a series of linguistic phenomena, otherwise lacking sufficient explanation. The theoretical principles on which Guillaume founds his discourse on comprehension, refer to three aspects in particular: operative time, the central concept of Guillaume’s approach to the problems of language, the reciprocity of the relationship between language and discourse, and the idea of succession in the process of constructing language. (shrink)

Rocco Gangle addresses the methodological questions raised by a commitment to immanence in terms of how diagrams may be used both as tools and as objects of philosophical investigation. Gangle integrates insights from Spinoza, Pierce and Deleuze in conjunction with the formal operations of category theory.

It has long been known that brain damage has important negative effects on one’s mental life and even eliminates one’s ability to have certain conscious experiences. It thus stands to reason that when all of one’s brain activity ceases upon death, consciousness is no longer possible and so neither is an afterlife. It seems clear that human consciousness is dependent upon functioning brains. This essay reviews some of the overall neurological evidence from brain damage studies and concludes that our argument (...) from brain damage has been vindicated by such overwhelming evidence. It also puts forth a more mature philosophical rationale against an afterlife and counters several replies to the argument. -/- 1. Philosophical Background -- 2. The Dependence of Consciousness on the Brain: Some Preliminary Evidence -- 3. Brain Damage, Lesion Studies, and the Localization of Mental Function - 3.1 Perception - 3.2 Awareness, Comprehension, and Recognition - 3.3 Memory - 3.4 Personality - 3.5 Language - 3.6 Emotion - 3.7 Decision-Making - 3.8 Social Cognition and Theory of Mind - 3.9 Moral Judgment and Empathy - 3.10 Neurological Disorders and Disease - 3.11 The Unity of Consciousness -- 4. Objections and Replies - 4.1 Souls, Minds, and Energy Fields - 4.2 The Instrument Theory - 4.3 The Embodied Soul Alone is Affected -- 5. Conclusion. (shrink)

It is often said that some kind of peripheral (or inattentional) conscious awareness accompanies our focal (attentional) consciousness. I agree that this is often the case, but clarity is needed on several fronts. In this paper, I lay out four distinct theses on peripheral awareness and show that three of them are true. However, I then argue that a fourth thesis, commonly associated with the so-called "self-representational approach to consciousness," is false. The claim here is that we have outer focal (...) consciousness accompanied often (or even always) by inner peripheral (self-)awareness. My criticisms stem from both methodological and phenomenological considerations. In doing so, I offer a diagnosis as to why the fourth thesis has seemed true to so many and also show how the so-called "transparency of experience," frequently invoked by representationalists, is importantly relevant to my diagnosis. Finally, I respond to several objections and to further attempts to show that thesis four is true. What emerges is that if one wishes to hold that some form of self-awareness accompanies all outer-directed conscious states, one is better off holding that such self-awareness is itself unconscious, as is held for example by standard higher-order theories of consciousness. (shrink)

The so-called 'higher-order thought' theory of consciousness says that what makes a mental state conscious is the presence of a suitable higher-order thought directed at it . The HOT theory has been or could be attacked from two apparently opposite directions. On the one hand, there is what Stubenberg has called 'the problem of the rock' which, if successful, would show that the HOT theory proves too much. On the other hand, it might also be alleged that the HOT theory (...) does not or cannot address the so-called 'hard problem' of phenomenal consciousness. If so, then the HOT theory would prove too little. We might say, then, that the HOT theory is arguably between a rock and a hard place. In this paper, I critically examine these objections and defend the HOT theory against them. In doing so, I hope to show that the HOT theory, or at least some version of it, neither proves too little nor too much, but is just right. I also show that these two objections are really just two sides of the same coin, and that the HOT theory is immune from David Chalmers' criticisms of other attempted reductionist accounts of consciousness. (shrink)

In diesem Aufsatz sollen einmal mehr zentrale Begründungsschritte im Ausweis der menschlichen Willensfreiheit in den Sektionen 2 und 3 von GMSIII untersucht werden, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des in Sektion 3 formulierten Zirkels von Freiheit und Sittlichkeit. Das zentrale Ergebnis zur zweiten Sektion besagt, dass Kant dort keinen Beweis der menschlichen Willensfreiheit leistet, er vielmehr den eigentlichen Beweis, der in der dritten Sektion geleistet wird, bloß skizzierend vorwegnimmt. In der dritten Sektion liefert Kant eine geschlossene Argumentation von der notwendig anzunehmenden Vernünftigkeit (...) vernünftiger Wesen zur notwendigen Annahme transzendentaler Freiheit bis zur notwendigen Zuschreibung von Sittlichkeit, wobei der Schluss von der Freiheit der epistemischen Vernunft auf die praktischtranszendentale Freiheit geschieht. Dieser Befund ergibt sich zumindestdann, wenn man den Zirkel als eine eindeutige petitio principii liest, wofür auch sehr viel spricht. Allerdings ergeben sich in dieser Lesart Schwierigkeiten, Kants selbst formulierten Ausweg aus dem Zirkel zu interpretieren, wie er ihn am Ende der dritten Sektion formuliert. (shrink)